Which robotics or physical intelligence companies listed on US stock markets may increase significantly in value in the next few years?

The best valuations come with less concentrated robotics exposure

The shortlist contains an important trade-off. Zebra sells identification, data-capture and workflow infrastructure. Globus is predominantly a musculoskeletal devices company with imaging, navigation and robotics capabilities. PROCEPT offers more concentrated surgical-robotics exposure; Mobileye combines an established driving-assistance business with more ambitious autonomy and humanoid development. Investors buying these shares are buying different sources of earnings. [1] [6] [7] [4]

Zebra is our preferred broad automation infrastructure candidate because its valuation can work with an achievable cash-growth requirement. Management expects more than $1 billion of 2026 free cash flow. Our central case requires $1.55 billion by 2030, within a downside-to-upside range of $700 million–$1.70 billion. Growth from a $1 billion starting point to the central outcome is approximately 12% annually. [1]

The operating demand is visible. Zebra reported $1.56 billion of second-quarter sales and 9.2% organic growth. Its equipment helps businesses identify goods, track assets and execute workflows as automation spreads. We like that breadth: the investment can work without selecting the winning robot design. Services and software contributed $241 million of quarterly sales, so the earnings case still depends heavily on products. [1]

The immediate test is cash conversion. First-half operating cash of $387 million less $26 million of capital expenditure produced $361 million of free cash flow. To exceed annual guidance, the second half must contribute more than $639 million. Moreover, the rise in reported gross margin from 47.6% to 53.0% benefited primarily from tariff recoveries and foreign exchange. Zebra recognized $73 million of recoveries and received $14 million during the quarter. We require cash generation that survives those effects. [1]

At 19 times central-case equity free cash flow and 48 million future shares, our valuation is about $614. If sustainable cash flow instead stalls at $1 billion, the same multiple and share count produce approximately $396—little appreciation from the reference price. The investment rests on growing cash, not merely assigning a robotics premium. [1] [5]

Globus offers a similarly grounded valuation, with an even clearer qualification about thematic exposure. Second-quarter adjusted EPS was $1.34, GAAP EPS was $1.10 and free cash flow was $177 million. We assume 2030 adjusted EPS of $4–$8, with $7 at the center. An 18-times central multiple produces $126 per share. [2]

We start the earnings bridge at an assumed normalized $4.80 annually, below the $5.36 mechanical annualization of second-quarter adjusted EPS. Reaching $7 requires approximately 10% annual EPS growth. That is plausible through sales growth and operating improvement, but the latest quarter’s 5.9% revenue growth makes the additional margin contribution important. We would scrutinize the adjustments between reported and underlying earnings. [2]

The robotics label should not obscure the business mix. Globus’s Enabling Technologies category, which includes imaging and navigation, generated $141 million in 2025—approximately 4.8% of total sales—and declined 8.4% from the preceding year. Our thesis is a medical-device earnings improvement, with robotics potentially supporting the franchise. At a terminal multiple of only 14 times $7 of EPS, value would be $98 rather than $126. [6] [2]

The upside depends on operating results investors can check

Those two cases establish the standard for the smaller companies: adoption must create earnings, and the financing needed to reach scale must leave enough value per share. The central assumptions below make that standard explicit. They are our underwriting choices, anchored to the reported financial starting points.

These assumptions explain the central valuations and identify the operating result each investment needs.

Sources: financial baselines from company releases; endpoint revenues, margins, multiples, cash and shares are our assumptions. [1] [2] [3] [4] [8]

Method: equity FCF × multiple ÷ future shares for Zebra and Cognex; EPS × P/E for Globus; enterprise value plus ending net cash, divided by future shares, for PROCEPT and Mobileye. The equity-FCF models already incorporate financing costs.

Scenario endpoints: Zebra uses $700 million FCF at 13× with 50 million shares, and $1.70 billion at 21× with 48 million. Globus uses $4 EPS at 12× and $8 at 22×. PROCEPT uses $400 million sales, 5% EBIT margin, 12× EBIT, zero net cash and 75 million shares; its favorable case uses $900 million sales, 20% margin, 20× EBIT, $50 million cash and 70 million shares. Mobileye uses $2 billion sales at 1.5×, $500 million cash and 1.05 billion shares; its favorable case uses $4.5 billion sales at 4×, $1 billion cash and 950 million shares. These are our assumptions applied to the cited financial baselines. [1] [2] [3] [4]

PROCEPT needs more procedures—and a profitable installed base

PROCEPT is our more focused robotics growth candidate because its commercial adoption is already measurable. Its US installed base reached 816 systems in the second quarter, when approximately 13,100 US procedures were performed. Quarterly revenue increased 19% to $94.5 million. The mechanism is straightforward: additional procedures create recurring handpiece demand across the installed system base. [3] [7]

Our central case requires approximately 100,000 annual US procedures by 2030, against management’s 2026 guidance of 54,000–56,000. That is roughly 16% annual growth from the midpoint. With our other revenue and profitability assumptions, the resulting value is $25.80 per share, within our broad $3.20–$52.14 scenario range. [3] [9] [5]

Sources: PROCEPT guidance and financial disclosures; valuation thresholds are our calculations. [3] [9] [5]

Note: the guidance bar uses the 55,000 midpoint. Thresholds assume $330 million other annual revenue, $3,479 per US procedure, 15% EBIT margin, 16× EV/EBIT, $50 million ending net cash and 65 million shares. Required procedures equal [(target equity value − net cash) ÷ (margin × multiple) − other revenue] ÷ revenue per procedure.

Profitability is as decisive as procedure growth. At 100,000 procedures, the model produces approximately $678 million of total revenue. A 15% operating margin supports the central valuation. Reduce that margin to 10%, keeping everything else unchanged, and value falls to $17.46—approximately the reference share price. [3] [5]

There is already a warning against extrapolating system placements directly into utilization. On the second-quarter call, chief executive Larry Wood said: “I think the biggest thing is that we’ve just seen more softness with our legacy AquaBeam accounts than what we anticipated.” Our calculation of about 66 annualized procedures per average installed system illustrates why the installed base needs active use: it divides quarterly procedures by the mean of the March and June system counts, then multiplies by four. [9] [3]

The balance sheet buys time, but time has a cost. PROCEPT held $228 million of cash in June against a fully drawn $52 million secured facility. A September amendment extended the loan’s maturity to October 2028. Its filing also listed 8.43 million potentially dilutive securities excluded from loss-period diluted EPS. Our future share assumptions therefore matter as much as the procedure curve. We would strengthen the case only as utilization, margins and financing develop together. [3] [7] [10]

Mobileye offers physical-intelligence upside from an existing revenue base

Mobileye is our preferred speculative autonomy recovery candidate because the starting business has substantial sales and cash generation. Second-quarter revenue was $508 million; full-year guidance was $1.97–$2.02 billion. First-half operating cash of $210 million less $51 million of property and equipment purchases yielded a $159 million pre-acquisition free-cash-flow proxy. [4]

Our 2030 sales scenarios range from $2 billion to $4.5 billion, with $3.5 billion at the center. The central valuation assumes 3.5 times enterprise value to sales, $1 billion of ending net cash and 920 million shares. It produces $14.40 per share, within a $3.33–$20 range. At a sustainable 15% cash margin, that sales multiple corresponds to approximately 23 times cash flow, so the valuation requires meaningful profitability. [4] [5]

A double from the $8.03 reference price requires approximately $3.94 billion of annual sales under the same central assumptions, or about 19% annual growth from the guidance midpoint. That is a substantial acceleration from flat year-over-year second-quarter revenue. At a lower 2.5-times sales multiple, the doubling hurdle rises to $5.51 billion and the central operating case is worth only $10.60 per share. [4] [5]

The gap between technical progress and commercial earnings is visible in Hamburg. Mobileye’s update described MOIA public-user testing with safety drivers in the vehicles. Meanwhile, the acquisition of Mentee Robotics expanded the company’s humanoid ambitions and consumed $591 million of net cash. We assign no separate humanoid premium: advanced driving must generate incremental paid business, while new development spending must leave cash for shareholders. [4]

Cognex is attractive technology at a demanding entry price

Cognex is the clearest example of why we separate business quality from expected returns. Machine vision helps automated equipment identify, inspect and handle objects. Cognex’s second-quarter sales grew 17% to $291 million, with approximately $86 million of operating income and $68 million of free cash flow. Those are attractive existing economics. [8]

The proposed RealSense acquisition adds robotic-perception capabilities, but shareholders are paying for the opportunity. Announced consideration was approximately $500 million, funded from $755 million of cash and investments. Management also outlined a three-year $56.5 million cash-retention program at target and approximately $50 million of restricted stock awards. RealSense’s expected 2026 revenue was $80–$90 million, and closing was scheduled for the fourth quarter. [8] [11]

Our Cognex valuation ranges from approximately $25 to $117 per share, with $70 at the center. The central case assumes $2 billion of 2030 sales, a 24% free-cash-flow margin, 26 times cash flow and 178 million shares. That margin is close to the latest quarter’s approximately 23% cash conversion; it still requires considerable growth. The central return from $58.66 is only about 20%. [8] [5]

A 50% gain at that multiple and share count requires more than $602 million of sustainable FCF; a double requires $803 million. Our favorable $117 case assumes $2.4 billion of sales, a 30% cash margin and a 29-times multiple. We are skeptical of treating that combination as the default. With our central operating view unchanged, an entry near $47 would offer approximately 50% appreciation to the endpoint. [8] [11] [5]

Symbotic and Ouster must grow into large expectations

Symbotic has genuine operating momentum. Its latest reported quarter generated $721 million of revenue and $32.9 million of GAAP operating income, a margin of approximately 4.6%. The valuation question begins with ownership: the June table contained roughly 604 million economic interests, including units beyond the publicly traded Class A shares. At the research reference price of $43.47, those interests imply approximately $26.3 billion of equity value. [12] [13] [5]

For the stock to double with 630 million future shares and a 30-times equity-FCF multiple, annual sustainable free cash flow must reach approximately $1.83 billion. At a 15% cash margin, that requires $12.2 billion of revenue. Even a favorable combination of $8 billion sales, an 18% cash margin and a 35-times multiple produces $80 per share, below the $86.94 doubling threshold. Our concern is the distance between present profitability and the result the valuation needs. [12] [13] [5]

The Walmart arrangement shows why following the cash matters. Walmart committed $520 million of development funding, including $230 million at closing. Symbotic simultaneously agreed to pay Walmart $200 million upfront for its advanced robotics business, with additional contingent consideration. The planned deployment of systems at 400 pickup-and-delivery locations depended on performance criteria. The buyer helps finance development, while the supplier acquires capabilities and assumes execution obligations. [14]

Customer funding is valuable, but shareholders ultimately need cash after delivery costs. Symbotic’s $306 million of nine-month operating cash included $143 million of stock-based compensation added back in the cash-flow reconciliation, alongside working-capital movements. We would move the stock up our list as sustainable cash returns approach the valuation hurdle, or as a lower entry price reduces it. [13]

Ouster presents the same tension at a smaller scale. Second-quarter revenue grew 56% to $55 million, with more than 17,000 lidar and camera sensors shipped for revenue. Gross margin improved to 49%, yet the company recorded a $20 million operating loss. There is real paid demand and real work left in the cost structure. [15]

At the $43.72 reference price, a double requires approximately $1.28 billion of annual revenue assuming 90 million future shares, $200 million net cash and six times sales. The latest quarter annualizes to $220 million; closing that gap in four years requires approximately 55% annual growth while establishing attractive profitability. We give that possibility meaningful weight, but insufficient weight to make Ouster a preferred risk-adjusted selection. [15] [5]

Commercial scale matters more than the most memorable demonstration

The smaller deployment stories sharpen our preference for an existing earnings base. Serve reported more than 2,000 cumulative robot deployments, but its second-quarter average daily active delivery fleet was 792. Revised annual revenue guidance was $9–$10 million, while first-half operating cash use reached $84.7 million. Deployment needs to translate into substantially greater paid activity. [16] [17]

Aurora had accumulated nearly 440,000 driverless miles through June and projected more than 200 operating driverless trucks at year-end, equivalent to an approximately $80 million annualized revenue run rate. Second-quarter operating cash use and capital expenditure together were approximately $256 million. We see technical and operational progress, alongside a large financing burden relative to the commercial objective. [18]

Richtech illustrates another distinction: a large cash balance can coexist with a small operating business. It reported $340 million of cash and short-term investments, $1.37 million of quarterly revenue and almost 29.8 million Class B shares issued over nine months. We would need recurring robot economics to justify making it a leading selection. [19]

At the other end of the spectrum, Intuitive remains a strong quality alternative. Its da Vinci installed base reached 11,710 systems, and instruments and accessories contributed $1.73 billion of $2.89 billion quarterly revenue—approximately 60%, before service revenue. That is the recurring platform model the younger companies aspire to build. We have not established a superior entry valuation relative to our shortlist. [20]

We would also avoid choosing Tesla or Nvidia on robotics alone: our investment case would need robotics earnings to matter to the whole-company valuation. Teradyne makes the exposure question concrete—its approximately $100 million robotics quarter sat inside $1.33 billion of group revenue, dominated by testing businesses. These judgments concern the robotics thesis, rather than the prospects of every other business those companies own. [21]

The investable universe also changes. Asensus shares ceased trading following its acquisition by KARL STORZ; NYSE trading in Vicarious Surgical shares was suspended in March 2026. Private developers and obsolete exchange listings should stay outside a current listed-stock shortlist. [22] [23]